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In our digital and connected societies, the development of social
networks, online shopping, and reputation systems raises the
questions of how individuals use social information and how
it affects their decisions. We report experiments performed in
France and Japan, in which subjects could update their estimates
after having received information from other subjects. We mea-
sure and model the impact of this social information at individual
and collective scales. We observe and justify that, when individ-
uals have little prior knowledge about a quantity, the distribu-
tion of the logarithm of their estimates is close to a Cauchy dis-
tribution. We find that social influence helps the group improve
its properly defined collective accuracy. We quantify the improve-
ment of the group estimation when additional controlled and reli-
able information is provided, unbeknownst to the subjects. We
show that subjects’ sensitivity to social influence permits us to
define five robust behavioral traits and increases with the differ-
ence between personal and group estimates. We then use our
data to build and calibrate a model of collective estimation to
analyze the impact on the group performance of the quantity
and quality of information received by individuals. The model
quantitatively reproduces the distributions of estimates and the
improvement of collective performance and accuracy observed in
our experiments. Finally, our model predicts that providing a mod-
erate amount of incorrect information to individuals can counter-
balance the human cognitive bias to systematically underestimate
quantities and thereby improve collective performance.
social influence | wisdom of crowds | collective intelligence |
self-organization | computational modeling
In a globalized, connected, and data-driven world, people relyincreasingly on online services to fulfill their needs. AirBnB,
Amazon, Ebay, and Trip Advisor, to name just a few, have in
common the use of feedback and reputation mechanisms (1) to
rate their products, services, sellers, and customers. Ideas and
opinions increasingly propagate through social networks, such as
Facebook or Twitter (2–4), to the point that they have the power
to cause political shifts (5). In this context, it is crucial to under-
stand how social influence affects individual decision-making and
its resulting effects at the level of a group.
Two observations can be made about these collective phe-
nomena: (i) people often make decisions not simultaneously
but sequentially (6, 7), and (ii) decision tasks involve judgmen-
tal/subjective aspects. Social psychological research on group
decision-making has established that consensual processes vary
greatly depending on the demonstrability of answers (8). When
the solution is easy to show, people often follow the “truth-wins”
process, whereas when the demonstrability is low, they are much
more susceptible to “majoritarian” social influence (9). Thus,
collective estimation tasks where correct solutions cannot be eas-
ily shown are particularly well suited for measuring the impact
of social influence on individuals’ decisions. Galton’s original
work (10) on estimation tasks shows that the median of indepen-
dent estimates of a quantity can be impressively close to its true
value. This phenomenon has been popularized as the wisdom
of crowds (WOC) effect (11), and it is generally used to mea-
sure a group’s performance. However, because of the indepen-
dence condition, it does not consider potential effects of social
influence.
In recent years, it has been debated whether social influence is
detrimental to the WOC or not: some works argue that it reduces
group diversity without improving the collective error (12, 13),
while others show that it is beneficial if one defines collective
performance otherwise (14, 15). One or two of the following
measures were used to define performance and diversity. Let us
define Ei as the estimate of individual i , 〈Ei〉 as its average over
all individuals, and T as the true value of the quantity to esti-
mate. Then, GD = 〈(Ei − 〈Ei〉)2〉 is a measure of group diversity,
and G=(〈Ei〉 − T )2 and G′= 〈(Ei − T )2〉 are two natural mea-
sures of the group performance. However, these estimators are
not independent, since G′ = G+GD , which shows that a decrease
in diversity GD is beneficial to group performance, as measured
by G′, contrary to the general claim. Later research showed
that social influence helps the group perform better if one con-
siders only information coming from informed (16), successful
(17), or confident (18) individuals. We will show that these traits
are actually strongly related. The way that social information is
defined also matters: providing individuals with the arithmetic or
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geometric mean of estimates of other individuals has different
consequences (18).
Other than these methodological issues, it is difficult to pre-
cisely analyze and characterize the impact of social influence on
individual estimates without controlling the quality and quan-
tity of information that is exchanged between subjects. Indeed,
human groups are often composed of individuals with heteroge-
neous expertise; therefore, in a collective estimation task, one
cannot rigorously control the quality and quantity of shared
social information, and the quantification of individual sensitivity
to this information is hence very delicate. To overcome this prob-
lem, we performed experiments in which subjects were asked to
estimate quantities about which they had very little prior knowl-
edge (low demonstrability of answers) before and after having
received social information. The interactions between subjects
were sequential and local, while most previous works have used
a global kind of interaction, with all individuals being provided
some information (estimates of other individuals in the group)
at the same time (12–14, 18, 19). From the individuals’ esti-
mates and the social information that they received, we were
able to deduce their sensitivity to social influence. Moreover,
by introducing virtual experts (artificial subjects providing the
true answer, thus affecting social information) in the sequence
of estimates—without the subjects being aware of it—we were
able to control the quantity and quality of information provided
to the subjects and to quantify the impact of this information on
the group performance.
Our results show that the subjects’ reaction to social influence
is heterogeneous and depends on the distance between personal
and group opinion. We then use the data to build and calibrate a
model of collective estimation to analyze and predict the impact
of information quantity and quality received by individuals on the
performances at the group level.
Experimental Design
Subjects were asked to answer questions for which they had to
estimate various social, geographical, or astronomical quantities
or the number or length of objects in a picture. For each ques-
tion, the experiment proceeded in two steps: subjects had to first
provide their personal estimate Ep . Then, after receiving the
social information I , they were asked to give a new estimate E .
I is defined as the geometric mean of the τ previous estimates
E (τ =1 or 3). Subjects answered each question sequentially (SI
Appendix, Fig. S1) and were not told the value of τ . Since humans
think in terms of orders of magnitude (20), we used the geomet-
ric mean for I —which averages orders of magnitude—rather
than the arithmetic one.
Virtual “experts” providing the true value E =T for each
question were inserted at random into the sequence of partic-
ipants (SI Appendix, Fig. S1). For each sequence involving 20
human participants, we controlled the number n =0, 5, 15, or 80,
and hence, the percentage ρ=n/(n + 20) = 0, 20, 43, or 80% of
virtual experts, respectively. The social information delivered to
human participants, being the geometric mean of previous esti-
mates, is hence strongly affected by these virtual experts.
When providing their estimates Ep and E , subjects had to
report their confidence level in their answer on a Likert scale
ranging from one (very low) to five (very high) and were asked
to choose the reason that best explained their second estimate
among a list of eight possibilities. We used initial conditions for
the social information I chosen reasonably far from the true
answer T and imposed loose limits to the estimates that sub-
jects could give to prevent them from answering too absurdly. All
graphs presented here are based on the 29 questions (5,394 × 2
prior and final estimates) from the experiment performed in
France. A similar experiment was conducted in Japan; all results
can be found in SI Appendix, where the full experimental proto-
col is described in detail.
The aims and procedures of the experiments conformed to
the ethical rules imposed by the Toulouse School of Economics
and the Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences at
Hokkaido University. All subjects in France and Japan provided
written consent for their participation.
Results
Distribution of Individual Estimates. Previous works have shown
that distributions of independent individual estimates are gen-
erally highly right-skewed, while distributions of their common
logarithm are much more symmetric (12, 13, 18). This is because
humans think in terms of orders of magnitude, especially when
large quantities are involved, which makes the logarithmic scale
more natural to represent human estimates (20). In these works,
participants were mostly asked “easy” questions for which they
had good prior knowledge (high demonstrability), such that the
answers ranged over one to two orders of magnitude at most (12–
14, 17–19, 21–23). To ensure that little information was present
before the inclusion of our virtual experts and to more clearly
identify the impact of social influence, we selected “hard” ques-
tions (low demonstrability). These questions involve very large
quantities, and answers span several orders of magnitude, mak-
ing the log transform of estimates even more relevant. To com-
pare quantities that can differ by orders of magnitude, we nor-
malize each estimate E by the true answer T to the question at
hand and define the log-transformed estimate X = log(E/T ).
Note that the log transform of the actual answer T is X = 0.
Fig. 1A shows the distribution of X before and after social
information has been provided to the subjects (SI Appendix,
Table S1). Although such distributions have often been pre-
sented as close to Gaussian distributions (13, 18), we find that
they are much better described by Cauchy distributions because
of their fat tails, which account for the nonnegligible probability
of estimates extremely far from the truth. The Cauchy probability
distribution function reads




(X −m)2 + σ2
, [1]
where m is the center/median and σ is the width of the distri-
bution. SI Appendix, Fig. S2A shows the distribution of estimates
Fig. 1. (A) Probability distribution function (PDF) of log-transformed nor-
malized estimates X = log(E/T), where E is the subject’s estimate and T is
the true answer to the question before (blue) and after (red) social influ-
ence. All conditions (ρ, τ ) are aggregated (SI Appendix, Fig. S3 shows the
PDF for each value of ρ). Solid lines are the results of our model based on
Cauchy distributions, while dashed lines are Gaussian fits. (B) PDF of sen-
sitivities to social influence S. The numbers at the top are the probabili-
ties for each category of behavior: contradict (Cont; S< 0), keep (Ke; S = 0),
compromise (Comp; 0< S< 1), adopt (Ad; S = 1), and overreact (Ov; S> 1).
Experimental data are shown in black, and numerical simulations of the
model are in red. The full range of S goes from −30 to 200. The figure is
limited to the interval [−1, 2], and the values of S outside this range were
grouped in the boxes S<−1 and S> 2.




















in the Japan experiment, and SI Appendix, Fig. S2B shows that,
when the same questions were asked, distributions of personal
estimates in France and Japan are almost identical.
For the Cauchy distribution, the mean and standard deviation
(SD) are not defined. Therefore, good estimators of m and σ
are the median and one-half the interquartile range (the differ-
ence between the third and the first quartiles) of the experimen-
tal distribution, respectively. In the following, mp (m) and σp (σ)
will refer to the median and one-half the interquartile range of
the experimental distribution before social influence (after social
influence), respectively.
Cauchy and Gaussian distributions belong to the so-called sta-
ble distributions family. More generally, {Xi} being a set of esti-
mates drawn from a symmetric probability distribution f char-
acterized by its center m and width σ, we define the weighted
average X ′=
∑
i piXi , with
∑
i pi =1; f is a stable distribution
if X ′ has the same probability distribution f as the original Xi ,
up to the new width σ′. Indeed, the center m remains the same
because of the condition
∑
i pi =1, but the width may decrease
after averaging (law of large numbers), depending on the stable
distribution f considered. Cauchy and Gaussian represent two
extremes of the stable distribution family, with Lévy distribu-
tions being intermediate cases: for the Cauchy distribution, the
width σ remains unchanged, whereas the narrowing of σ is max-
imum for the Gaussian distribution (SI Appendix). In the case of
actual human estimates, the relevance of a certain distribution
f can be related to the degree of prior knowledge of the group.
When individuals have no idea about the answer to a question,
the weighted average of arbitrary answers cannot be statisti-
cally better (σ′<σ) or worse (σ′>σ) than the arbitrary answers
themselves, leading to a Cauchy distribution for these estimates
(the only distribution for which σ′=σ). However, when there
is a good prior knowledge, one expects that combining answers
gives a better statistical estimate (σ′<σ; Gaussian). When the
quantity to estimate is closely related to general intuition (ages,
dates, etc.), estimates should hence follow a Gaussian-like distri-
bution, while when individuals have very little knowledge about
the answer, as in our experiment, estimates should be Cauchy-
like distributed. The rationale for naturally observing stable dis-
tributions is explained in SI Appendix.
We use the term Cauchy-like, because Fig. 1A shows that the
distributions of prior (Xp) and final (X ) estimates are slightly
skewed toward low estimates (X < 0), reminiscent of the human
cognitive bias to underestimate numbers, because of the nonlin-
ear internal representation of quantities (24). As we will show,
this phenomenon has strong implications on the influence of
information provided to the group. We also observe a clear
sharpening of the distribution of estimates after social influ-
ence mainly caused by the presence of the virtual experts, hence
affecting the value of the social information M = log(I /T ) and
ultimately, the final estimate X of the actual subjects. This sharp-
ening becomes stronger as the percentage of experts increases
(SI Appendix, Fig. S3).
Moreover, consistent with our introductory discussion of
the measurement methods of group performance, we pro-
pose the two following indicators: (i) collective performance
|median(Xi)|, which represents how close the center of the dis-
tribution is to zero (the log transform of the true value T ), and
(ii) collective accuracy median(|Xi |), which is a measure of the
proximity of individual estimates to the true value.
Distribution of Individual Sensitivities to Social Influence. After hav-
ing received social information, an individual i may reconsider
her personal estimate Epi . The natural way for humans to
aggregate estimates is to use the median (22) or the geomet-
ric mean (18), which both tend to reduce the effect of outliers.
Here, the social information that we provided to the subject
was the geometric mean of the τ previous answers (including





. Moreover, one can always represent the
new estimate Ei as the weighted geometric average of the per-
sonal estimate Epi and the social information Ii . Hence, we
can uniquely define the sensitivity to social influence Si by
Ei =Epi
1−Si Ii
Si . The value Si =0 corresponds to subjects keep-
ing their initial estimates, while Si = 1 corresponds to subjects
adopting the estimate of their peers. In terms of log-transformed
variables Xi = log(Ei/T ), we obtain
Xi = (1− Si)Xpi + SiMi , [2]
where the log-transformed social information is simply the arith-
metic mean Mi =(1/τ)
∑i−1
j=i−τ Xj , and thus, Si =(Xi −Xpi)/
(Mi −Xpi). Note that, in this language, Si is simply the barycen-
ter coordinate of the final estimate in terms of the initial personal
estimate and the social information.
Fig. 1B shows that the experimental distribution of S has
a bell-shaped part that we roughly assimilate to a Gaussian,
with two additional Dirac peaks exactly at S =0 and S =1 (SI
Appendix, Table S2 shows the numerical values). Five types of
behavioral responses can be identified: keeping one’s opinion
(peak at S = 0), adopting the group’s opinion (peak at S = 1),
making a compromise between one’s opinion and the group’s
opinion (0 < S < 1), overreacting to social information (S > 1),
and contradicting it (S < 0). Quite surprisingly, responses that
consist of overreacting and contradicting were generally over-
looked in previous works (21–23, 25), either considered as noise
and simply not taken into account or sometimes included into
the peaks at S = 0 and S = 1, despite these behaviors being not
negligible (especially overreacting). We find that the median of S
is 0.34, in agreement with previous results (15, 18, 25), meaning
that individuals tend to give more weight to their own opinion
than to information coming from others (14, 19). Moreover, the
distributions of S for the experiment performed in Japan and for
men and women (in France) are very similar to that of Fig. 1B
(SI Appendix, Fig. S4).
We find that the subjects’ behavioral reactions are highly
consistent, reflecting robust differences in personality or gen-
eral knowledge: in each session, according to the way that sub-
jects modified their estimates on average in the first 24 ques-
tions, we split the subjects into three subgroups. We first define
“confident” subjects as the one-quarter of the group minimiz-
ing 〈|Sq |〉q , where q is the index of the questions (i.e., the sub-
jects who were on average closest to S = 0), and the “follow-
ers” as the one-quarter of the group minimizing 〈|1− Sq |〉q (i.e.,
closest to S = 1). The other one-half of the group is defined
as the “average” subjects. SI Appendix, Fig. S5 shows the distri-
butions of S for the three subgroups computed from questions
25–29. The differences are striking (SI Appendix, Fig. S6): for the
group of confident subjects, the peak at S = 0 is about seven
times higher than the peak at S = 1, while for the group of fol-
lowers, it is less than twice larger. Moreover, the distribution for
average subjects is found to be very close to the global distribu-
tion shown in Fig. 1B.
Impact of the Difference Between Personal and Group’s Opinions
on Individual Sensitivity to Social Influence. Fig. 2A shows that,
on average, S depends on the distance D = log(Ep/I )=Xp −
M between personal and group estimates. Up to a threshold
of t ≈ 2.5 orders of magnitude, there is a linear cusp relation
between S and D . The farther away the social information M
is from a subject’s personal estimate Xp , the more likely the lat-
ter is to trust the group as S increases. Fig. 2B shows the origin of
this correlation: as social information gets farther from personal
opinion, the probability to keep one’s opinion (S =0) decreases,
while the probability to compromise increases. Interestingly,
the adopting behavior does not change with D . The same

























































Fig. 2. (A) Mean sensitivity to social influence S against the distance
D = Xp −M between personal estimate Xp and social information M (group
estimate). Black circles correspond to experimental data, while red open
circles are simulations of the model. Note that only about 14% of data
are beyond three orders of magnitude. (B) Fraction of subjects keeping
(maroon), adopting (pink), and being in the Gaussian-like part of the dis-
tribution of S (mostly compromisers; purple) against D.
phenomena have been observed in the Japan experiment (SI
Appendix, Fig. S8).
Model. We now introduce an individual-based model to under-
stand the respective effects of individual sensitivity to social influ-
ence and information quality and quantity on collective perfor-
mance and accuracy observed at the group level. In the model,
we simulate a sequence of 20 successive estimates performed
by the agents (not including the virtual experts). A typical run
of the model consists of the following steps for a given condi-
tion (ρ, τ).
i) An initial condition X0 is chosen at random according to the
experimental ratios of initial conditions.
ii) With probability ρ, the true value zero is introduced into the
sequence, and with probability (1− ρ), an agent plays.
iii) The agent first determines its personal estimate Xp from a
Cauchy distribution f (Xp ,mp , σp) restricted to [−7; 7].
iv) The agent receives, as social information, the average of the
τ previous final estimates M .
v) The agent chooses its sensitivity to social influence S , con-
sistent with the results of Figs. 1B and 2. In particular, S
is drawn in a Gaussian distribution of mean mg with prob-
ability Pg or takes the value S =0 or S =1 with probabil-
ity P0 and P1 =1 − P0 − Pg. P0 and Pg have a linear cusp
dependence with D =Xp − M , while P1 is kept indepen-
dent of D . For a given value of D , the average sensitivity
is 〈S〉=P0 × 0 + P1 × 1 + Pg × mg =α + β|D |, where α
and the slope β are extracted from Fig. 2A. Pg is hence given
by Pg =(α+ β|D | − P1)/mg. The threshold t is determined
consistently by the condition Smax =α+βt , where Smax is the
value of the plateau beyond t in Fig. 2A. The values of all
parameters are reported in SI Appendix, Table S3.
vi) S being drawn, the final estimate X is given by Eq. 2. One
starts again from step ii for the next agent.
Comparison Between Theoretical and Experimental Results. For all
graphs, we ran 100,000 simulations, so that the model predic-
tions error bars are negligible. Fig. 1B shows that the distribution
of sensitivities to social influence S obtained in the model (red
curve in Fig. 1B) is similar by construction to the experimental
one. Also, by construction of the model (step v above), the cusp
dependence of the sensitivity to social influence with respect to
D =Xp−M is well-reproduced by the model (Fig. 2A, red curve
with open symbols). We now address several nontrivial predic-
tions of the model.
Estimates after social influence. Fig. 1A (all values of ρ aggre-
gated) and SI Appendix, Fig. S3 (for each ρ) compare favorably
the distributions of estimates predicted by the model with the
experimental results (before and after social influence). Social
influence leads to the sharpening of the distributions of esti-
mates, and this effect increases as more information is provided
to the group.
Impact of social information on collective performance. Fig. 3
shows the collective performance (precisely defined above) and
the width of the distribution of estimates for the different ρ and
τ . The collective performance is zero when the distribution is
centered on the true value, such that the closer it is to zero, the
better. As expected, when ρ = 0%, no significant improvement
is observed in the collective performance. Then, as ρ increases,
the center gets closer to the true value, and the width decreases
accordingly, such as was also observed in the experiments in
Japan (SI Appendix, Fig. S9). Note that the experimental error
bars (SI Appendix describes their computation) decrease after
social influence, reflecting the decrease of the width of the esti-
mate distribution after social influence and the driving of peo-
ple’s opinion by the virtual experts.
The collective performance and estimate distribution width
predicted by the model (Fig. 3, open circles) are in good agree-
ment with those observed in the experiment. The very small
effect of τ , only reliably observed in the model in Fig. 3A, is
explained in SI Appendix. As shown there, a simpler model,
where we neglect the dependence of S with D =Xp − M (Fig.
2A), can be analytically solved. It leads to fair predictions (black
lines on Fig. 3), although it tends to underestimate the collective
performance improvement and does not capture the reduction
of the distribution width already observed at ρ=0%. This model
guided us to design our experiments, and its relative failure moti-
vated us to investigate the phenomenon illustrated in Fig. 2 and
included in the full model described above.
Impact of sensitivity to social influence on collective accuracy.
Fig. 4 (SI Appendix, Fig. S11 shows an alternative representation)
shows the collective accuracy for the five categories of behavioral
responses identified in Fig. 1B and for the whole group before
and after social information has been provided. Before social
influence, keeping leads to the best accuracy, while adopting
and overreacting behaviors are associated with the worst accu-
racy. However, as more reliable information is indirectly pro-
vided by the experts, and in particular for ρ ≥ 40%, adopting
and overreacting lead to the best accuracy after social influence
(14, 19). The contradicting behavior is the only one for which the
Fig. 3. Collective performance, defined as the absolute value of the
median of estimates (A) and width of the distribution of estimates (B), for
all (ρ, τ ) before (blue) and after (red) social influence. Both improve with
ρ after social influence, except for the collective performance at ρ= 0 %.
Full circles correspond to experimental data, while open circles represent
the predictions of the full model. The black lines are the predictions of the
simple solvable model presented in SI Appendix. For ρ= 60 %, only model
predictions are available.




















Fig. 4. Collective accuracy (median distance to the truth of individual esti-
mates) before (blue) and after (red) social influence against ρ for the five
behavioral categories identified in Fig. 1B and for the whole group (all).
Adopting leads to the sharpest improvement and the best accuracy for
ρ≥ 40 %. Full circles correspond to experimental data, while open circles
represent the predictions of the model (including for ρ= 60%, a case not
tested experimentally).
accuracy is deteriorating after social influence. Finally, com-
promising leads to a systematic improvement of the accuracy
as the percentage of experts increases (better than keeping for
ρ ≥ 40%), very similar to that of the whole group. The collec-
tive accuracy for each behavioral category is again fairly well-
predicted by the model (we discuss below the disagreement
between model predictions and experimental data in Fig. 4 for
the adopters before social influence).
The sensitivity to social influence and the collective accu-
racy are strongly related to confidence (SI Appendix, Fig. S10).
The more confident the subjects, the less they tend to follow
the group and the better their accuracy is, especially before
social influence. This makes the link between confident (18),
informed (16), and successful (17) individuals: they are gener-
ally the same persons. However, individuals who are too con-
fident (keeping behavior; arguably because they have an idea
about the answer, hence their good accuracy before social influ-
ence) tend to discard others’ opinion. Although it might some-
times work—especially if no external information is provided
(ρ=0%)—they lose the opportunity to benefit from valuable
information learned by others. Meanwhile, adopting and overre-
acting subjects have poor confidence and accuracy before social
influence, arguably because they do not know much about the
questions. Note that the model, not including any notion of con-
fidence or heterogeneous prior knowledge, overestimates the
quality of the accuracy before social influence for the adopt-
ing behavior. However, even at ρ=0%, adopting subjects per-
form about as well as the other categories after social influence.
In fact, if enough information is provided (ρ=80%), they are
even able to reach almost perfect collective accuracy. Similar
results have been found in the Japan experiment as shown on
SI Appendix, Fig. S12. SI Appendix, Figs. S13–S15 show similar
graphs for the collective performance in France and Japan.
Predicting the effect of incorrect information given to the human
group by virtual agents. We used the model to investigate the
influence on the group performance of the quality and quantity
of information delivered to the group (i.e., the value V of the
answer provided by the percentage ρ of virtual agents). In our
experiments, the group was provided with the (log transform of
the) true value V =0 (the agents were experts). We expect a
deterioration of the collective performance and accuracy as V
moves too far away from zero and as a greater amount of incor-
rect information is delivered to the group (by increasing ρ). The
optimum collective accuracy is reached for a strictly positive V ,
whatever the value of ρ> 0 (SI Appendix, Fig. S16), as also pre-
dicted by our simple analytical model. Hence, incorrect infor-
mation can be beneficial to the group: providing the group with
overestimated values can counterbalance the human cognitive
bias to underestimate quantities (24).
Discussion
Quantifying how social information affects individual estima-
tions and opinions is a crucial step to understand and model the
dynamics of collective choices or opinion formation (26). Here,
we have measured and modeled the impact of social informa-
tion at individual and collective scales in estimation tasks with
low demonstrability. By controlling the quantity and quality of
information delivered to the subjects, unbeknownst to them, we
have been able to precisely quantify the impact of social influence
on group performance. We also tested and confirmed the cross-
cultural generality of our results by conducting experiments in
France and Japan.
We showed and justified that, when individuals have poor
prior knowledge about the questions, the distribution of their
log-transformed estimates is close to a Cauchy distribution. The
distribution of the sensitivity to social influence S is bell-shaped
(contradict, compromise, overreact), with two additional peaks
exactly at S =0 (keep) and S =1 (adopt), which lead to the def-
inition of robust social traits as checked by further observing the
subjects inclined to follow these behaviors. When subjects have
little prior knowledge, we found that their sensitivity to social
influence increases (linear cusp) with the difference between
their estimate and that of the group, at variance with what was
found in ref. 19, for questions where subjects had a high prior
knowledge.
We used these experimental observations to build and cali-
brate a model that quantitatively predicts the sharpening of the
distribution of individual estimates and the improvement in col-
lective performance and accuracy as the amount of good infor-
mation provided to the group increases. This model could be
directly applied or straightforwardly adapted to similar situations
where humans have to integrate information from other people
or external sources.
We studied the impact of virtual experts on the group per-
formance, a methodology allowing us to rigorously control the
quantity (ρ) and quality (V ) of the information provided to a
group with little prior knowledge. These virtual experts can be
seen either as an external source of information accessible to
individuals (e.g., the Internet, social networks, media, etc.) or
as a very cohesive (all having the same opinion V ) and over-
confident (all having S =0) subgroup of the population, such as
can happen with “groupthink” (27). When these experts provide
reliable information to the group, a systematic improvement in
collective performance and accuracy is obtained experimentally
and is quantitatively reproduced by our model. Moreover, if the
experts are not too numerous and the information that they give
is slightly above the true value, the model predicts that social
influence can help the group perform even better than when the
truth is provided, as this incorrect information compensates for
the human cognitive bias to underestimate quantities.
We also showed that the sensitivity to social influence is
strongly related to confidence and accuracy: the most confident
subjects are generally the best performers and tend to weight the
opinion of others less. When the group has access to more reli-
able information, this behavior becomes detrimental to individ-
ual and collective accuracy, as too confident individuals lose the
opportunity to benefit from this information.
Overall, we showed that individuals, even when they have very
little prior knowledge about a quantity to estimate, are able
to use information from their peers or from the environment

























































to collectively improve the group performance as long as this
information is not highly misleading. Ultimately, getting a better
understanding of these influential processes opens perspectives
to develop information systems aimed at enhancing cooperation
and collaboration in human groups, thus helping crowds become
smarter (28, 29).
Future research will have to focus on the experimental vali-
dation of our theoretical predictions when providing incorrect
information to the group, with the intriguing possibility of actu-
ally improving its performance. It would also be interesting to
study the impact on the group performance of the number of
estimates given as social information (instead of only their mean)
and of revealing the confidence and/or reputation of those who
share these estimates.
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